Knowledge depends

Jie Gao at Edinburgh University made this comment on my “No True Scotsman” post:

“Hi Daniel, you have raised a very interesting thought. Indeed, a similar view has been argued by some other philosopher before! In the early 1990s, Crispin Sartwell attempted to call into question the traditional view that justification is a necessary condition for knowledge. He notes that we are often willing to ascribe knowledge in instances of very weak of even absent justification. Sartwell offers the example of a man who correctly believes his son is innocent of a crime in the face of overwhelming evidence against him, basing his belief solely upon the fact that the young man is his son. Sartwell claims that, in practice, we would likely say that he knows his son is innocent, despite the fact that the evidence he possesses does not support an attitude of belief. And recently, his claim has been supported by results of experiments. Davide Sackris and James Beebe report results of studies in which participants attributed knowledge to subjects who lacked good evidence but had true belief. Their paper is available here. Hope you would enjoy it! ”

I think I found it here instead.

It validates my suggested definition, and it goes further in an interesting way. People are more prone to attribute knowledge to people if they do harm than if they did good.

This reminded me of Marc Anthony’s Eulogy of Julius Cesar.

The evil that men do lives after them;
the good is oft interred with their bones.